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THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION IN THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM: A PROPOSAL
FOR A RULE CHANGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the purpose of the preliminary hearing seems to be
confined to avoidance of unreasonable pretrial detention, its
function is somewhat broader. In practice, the preliminary
hearing may serve as a valuable device to discover the prosecu-
tion's case, particularly in the absence of other effective means
of discovery. This explains why the prosecutor ordinarily
seeks to avoid such hearings.'
In the federal system, the United States Attorney frequently by-
passes the preliminary hearing 2 by asking the commissioner for a
continuance in order to gain time to go to the grand jury for an indict-
ment. Once an indictment has been returned, most courts hold that the
necessity for a preliminary hearing has been mooted.' This Comment
will seek to demonstrate the undesirable consequences which flow from
such a prosecutorial strategy. Through an analysis of the development
and functions of the preliminary examination, it will be seen that this
examination is a device which continues to have an important, if limited,
role to play in the administration of criminal justice. Under the present
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, the standard mootness
holding cannot be avoided. Therefore, a revision of the rules will be
proposed to ensure that an examination will be held.
II. DEVELOPMENT AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PRELIMINARY
EXAMINATION
The preliminary examination emerged in England in the mid-
sixteenth century, 4 apparently adopted to get some degree of govern-
1 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACtiCE 115.04 [1], at 5-28 (2d ed. 1967).
2 The terms "preliminary examination" and "preliminary hearing" are used inter-
changeably throughout this Comment.
3 See note 29 infra. The cases are unanimous in holding that there is no constitu-
tional right to a preliminary examination. United States ex rel. Hughes v. Gault,
271 U.S. 142 (1926) (Holmes, J.) ; Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70 (1895) ;
Dillard v. Bomar, 342 F.2d 789 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965); Garrison
v. Johnston, 104 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945); Wood v.
United States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (dictum) (Rutledge, J.); Clarke v.
Huff, 119 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ; In re Bates, 2 F. Cas. 1015 (No. 1099a) (D.C.
S.C. 1858). But cf. United States ex rel. Hughes v. Gault, 271 U.S. 142, 152 (1926)
(separate opinion), where Mr. Justice Brandeis stated that when the commissioner
does not hear evidence bearing upon the existence of probable cause, the defendant is
deprived of due process of law in violation of the fifth amendment.
4 An Act Touching Bailment of Persons, 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13, § 4 (1554) ("And
that the said justices . . .when any such prisoner is brought before them for man-
slaughter or felony, before any bailment ... ., shall take the examination of the said
(1416)
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mental participation in criminal prosecutions.5 Justices of the peace
(unpaid magistrates) "took evidence virtually as State prosecutors
preparing the case for the prosecution ;" ' the defendant was closely
examined as to all the circumstances of the alleged offense, while the
witnesses for the prosecution were questioned out of the defendant's
presence, "their evidence being viewed as only for the information of
the court." ' As late as 1823, grand juries were told that the mag-
istrate, when conducting the preliminary examination, acts inquisi-
torially, not judicially, that the proceedings are secret, and that the
information obtained is given only to the prosecutor and not to the
defendant.' The examination began to change significantly, however,
when a regular police force was established in the nineteenth century.9
With a police force to gather evidence for prosecution, it became easier
for the magistrate to act solely as a judge." These changes were recog-
nized in 1836 by passage of the Prisoner's Counsel Act, which permitted
the defendant to inspect all depositions taken against him,'1 and in
1848 by passage of the Indictable Offenses Act, which provided in
indictable cases that prosecution witnesses be examined in the de-
fendant's presence, that the defendant either could "answer to the
Charge" or remain silent, and that he could examine witnesses. 2
By this time, the purpose of the examination in England had
become to determine "whether a man should be made to stand his
trial." 13 The examination continued to develop, however, and "[a]s
so often happens with English legal institutions, the real purpose
which the hearing before the magistrates fulfills is not now the one
for which it was primarily designed." "' In England today the
prosecutor must disclose at the preliminary examination all the evidence
he intends to present at trial, each witness's testimony being recorded
in a signed deposition.' 5 If the prosecutor comes upon any new
prisoner, ...of the fact and circumstances thereof, ...or as much thereof as shall
be material to prove the felony shall put in writing before they make the same bail-
ment. . . ."); An Act to Take Examination of Prisoners Suspected of any Man-
slaughter or Felony, 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555) (extends act of 1554 to those
suspected of manslaughter or felony, but who are" not bailed).
5 See E. PuTTKAmmER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 91 (1953).
6 Williams, Introductory Survey of the Preliminary Examination in England,
Preliminary Investigation by Magistrates in Great Britain and Canada, in Hearings
on S. 3475 and S. 945 Before the Subcomnn. on Improvements in iAdicial Machinery
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
307 (1967) [These hearings are hereinafter cited as Hearings].
7 L. ORFuLD, CRIMINAL PRocELuRE FROM ARREST To APPEAL 55 (1947).
8Id.
9 Id. at 56.
' See id.
11 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 3 (1836).
12 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42, §§ 17-18 (1848).
13 P. DE iIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 107 (1958).
14Id. at 111.
15 Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. Rxv.
56, 65 (1961) ; see note 16 infra.
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evidence after the preliminary examination, he must serve notice on the
defense, setting out in the form of a statement by the witness the addi-
tional evidence he proposes to use.'"
In the United States, however, the discovery function of the
preliminary examination has not developed to such an extent. In the
federal system, the United States Attorney must bring forward only
enough evidence to satisfy the commissioner that there is "probable
cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the de-
fendant committed it." 17 Thus the degree of discovery obtained in
a preliminary examination will depend, in part, upon how much evi-
dence the magistrate deems necessary to establish probable cause in
a particular case. Even a high standard of probable cause will not
necessarily disclose all the evidence within the possession of the govern-
ment that the defendant may need.'"
Nevertheless, it is very likely that the defendant will discover
something, regardless of the quantum of evidence the commissioner
thinks sufficient. The United States Attorney must put some witnesses
on the stand, and thus defense counsel will learn their names and have
their testimony recorded, enabling him to impeach them if discrepancies
occur at trial.' In civil litigation, testimony can be fixed at an early
stage by depositions; in criminal litigation, the preliminary examination
is the only available counterpart.2" Defense counsel's opportunity for
pre-trial cross-examination 2 may also be valuable, since it is difficult at
trial to develop inconsistencies in testimony never heard before.'
Defense counsel may also be able to learn what written statements, which
can be subpoenaed later under the Jencks Act,23 have been made by or
to the police.
16 P. DmliN, supra note 13, at 112. Lord Devlin notes that when looking for the
most convenient authority to cite for this obvious proposition, "to my surprise I found
that there was no case in which such a rule had specifically been laid down." Never-
theless, he states "[tihere is no doubt about the practice... ." Id. at 113.
17 FEn. R. CRIM. P. 5 (c).
1
8 See S. RFp. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1967).
-) Statement of Lawrence Speiser, Director, Washington Office, American Civil
Liberties Union, Hearings, supra note 6, at 165.
20 Statement of Roland S. Homet, Attorney, Wash., D.C., Hearings, supra note 6,
at 191. FED. R. CRIm. P. 15 (a) provides for the taking of depositions, but only from
prospective witnesses who "may be unable to attend or prevented from attending a
trial" and whose testimony is "material" and must be taken "in order to prevent a
failure of justice."
21 FEa. R. CRIm. P. 5(c) provides that "[t]he defendant may cross-examine wit-
nesses against him . . ."
22 Speiser, Hearings, mpra note 19, at 165.
2 3 Homet, Hearings, supra note 20, at 191. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1964), provides for discovery, after a witness has testified on direct examination at
trial, of his statements or depositions in government possession.
The discovery advantages set forth in the text accompanying notes 19-24 throw
into question one criticism of the usefulness of the preliminary examination as a dis-
covery device: "Discovery . . . can most usefully take place at a later stage, much
closer to tria, when the evidence is more nearly complete and defense counsel is better
prepared." S. RE,. No. 371, supra note 18, at 34-35.
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In addition, the information obtained at a preliminary hearing may
provide a basis for avoiding trial altogether,2" a contingency which
benefits the prosecution, the public and the defense. The prosecutor gets
an important and useful trial run of some of his essential witnesses and
may find that his case is not as strong as he had supposed. Weaknesses
do not come out as readily in ex parte grand jury proceedings, where
probable cause is determined in secret by laymen under the guidance
of the prosecutor and without the benefit of cross-examination or
presentation of evidence by defense counsel.' Exposure of a weak
case may make the prosecutor more willing to bargain for a guilty
plea. On the other hand, the defendant will be able to make a more
informed plea since evidence brought out at preliminary examination
may enable defense counsel to better gauge the strength of the prosecu-
tion's case.26 Furthermore, defense counsel may inquire, at least super-
ficially, into the circumstances of arrest, search or confession and thus
be better prepared for a motion to suppress '7 which, if successful, may
avoid the expense of a trial.
Historically, then, a device originally intended as a prosecutorial
inquiry into the circumstances of a crime has evolved over the course of
centuries into one which is primarily of benefit to the defendant by pro-
tecting him from unnecessarily lengthy incarceration on unfounded
charges and granting him some measure of discovery of the govern-
ment's case. Even though the former protection may prove superfluous
in areas where a grand jury sits frequently,2 8 the latter is important
to all defendants in a criminal system with only a minimal number of
formal discovery devices.
2 Statement of Samuel Dash, Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Criminal
Law and Procedure, Georgetown University Law Center, Hearings, supra note 6,
at 141: "Experienced defense counsel and prosecutors who have worked with such a
system of preliminary examinations will testify that it is an excellent vehicle for
weeding out cases that should go no farther ...."
2 See United States v. Wingert, 55 F.2d 960, 961 (E.D.Pa. 1932) (grand jury
"no more than a star chamber proceeding with a carefully prepared prima facie case
submitted with all suggestions of what may be behind it shut out") (dictum), reld
sub nora. Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932) ; United States v. Kilpatrick,
16 F. 765, 771 (W.D.N.C. 1883) (noting that Mr. Justice Field felt that preliminary
examinations afford "the citizen the greatest security against false accusations from
any quarter") ; Dash, Hearings, supra note 24, at 139. Contra, L. Oprxi, supra note
7, at 75 ("Magistrates and justices of the peace are frequently scattered throughout
the county and ignorant of the law as compared to the prosecutor. Hence they are
more likely to be dominated and overridden by the prosecutor than they are to exercise
an effective checking influence. A better check than a weak preliminary examination
is the grand jury.').
26 "[The preliminary examination] encourages many pleas of guilty at a very
early stage, since defense counsel can realistically appraise the case for his client who
has been present and confronted by what the prosecutor has to offer against him."
Dash, Hearings, supra note 24, at 142.
27 Homet, Hearings, spra note 20, at 191.
28 It is noted in Memorandum Prepared By Staff of Subcomin. on Improvements
in Jiudicial Machinery, in Hearings, supra note 6, at 14, that because the "modern
practice" in urban areas is to have the grand jury sit continuously the preliminary
examination is "rendered obsolete." But see note 25 mspra.
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III. MOOTNESS AND RULE 5 (c)
This Comment is concerned with holdings that a grand jury
indictment moots the necessity for a preliminary examination.' Such
holdings have been the "basis for generally followed prosecutive strategy
of delaying the preliminary hearing until an indictment can be ob-
tained." " But rule 5 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which governs the preliminary examination in the federal system, speaks
to the commissioner in apparently mandatory terms: "If the defendant
does not waive the examination, the commissioner shall hear the
evidence within a reasonable time." "' (Emphasis added.)
29 Such holdings are found in cases decided both before and after the adoption
of the Federal Rules. Before, e.g.: Van Dam v. United States, 23 F.2d 235 (6th Cir.
1928) ; United States v. Averett, 26 F.2d 676 (W.D.Va. 1928) (citing cases) ; United
States v. Acken, 267 F. 595 (E.D.N.Y. 1920) ; see Barber v. United States, 142 F.2d
805 (4th Cir.) (unclear whether defendant arrested before indictment), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 741 (1944) ; United States ex rel. Perry v. Hiatt, 33 F. Supp. 1022 (M.D.Pa.
1940) (same) ; United States v. Reilly, 30 F.2d 866 (E.D.Pa. 1929) (same). After,
e.g.: United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1967) ; United States v. Heap, 345
F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965); Vincent v. United States, 337 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1964);
James v. Lawrence, 176 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949); United States v. Elksnis, 259
F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Jones v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 454 (E.D.Mo.
1963), appeal dismissed, 326 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1964); United States v. Brace, 192
F. Supp. 714 (D.Md. 1961); Boone v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 411 (W.D.Ky.
1959), affd per curiam, 280 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1960) ; United States v. Slaugenhoupt,
102 F. Supp. 820 (W.D.Pa. 1952).
In Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 220 (1965), there is dictum to the effect
that the defendant must be afforded preliminary examination as required by Rule 5 (c),
"unless before the preliminary hearing is held, the grand jury supersedes the com-
plaint procedure by returning an indictment."
80 8 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricc ff 5.04[3], at 5-30 (2d ed. 1967). Statements
deploring this strategy are fairly common, even in cases following the standard moot-
ness holding. E.g., United States v. Delman, 253 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(situation deplorable; motion to dismiss indictment denied) ; United States v. Cowan,
37 F.R.D. 215, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (practice "should not be countenanced"; motion
to dismiss indictment denied); United States v. Universita, 192 F. Supp. 154, 156
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("no apparent reason for delay"; petition for writ of habeas corpus
denied).
It seems evident that preliminary examinations are not held very frequently in the
federal system. Judge Weinfeld states that "Rule 5c . ..has fallen into disuse, at
least in the Southern District of New York. I am unaware of any instance in the
last several years in which a defendant has been accorded a hearing." Judicial Con-
ference of the Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, The Problem of Long
Criminal Trials, 34 F.R.D. 155, 165 (1963). Much instructive data is found in Staff
of Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, Report on United States Com-
missioner Responses to Subcomm. Questionnaire, Hearings, supra note 6, at 453
[hereinafter cited as Commissioners Survey]. This questionnaire was mailed to all
commissioners and had a return rate of over fifty per cent. It was found that the
"pattern of holding a Rule 5 (c) preliminary examination in only a small fraction of
cases seemed prevalent throughout the responses regardless of the fees earned by the
commissioner." Id. at 478. "A commissioner of seven years' service reports that he
has never held or scheduled a preliminary hearing and another states: 'In 12 years
I never had a preliminary hearing.'" Id. at 479. Among the busier commissioners,
the reason most frequently given for not holding the preliminary examination was
intervening grand jury indictment; the next most frequently given reason was waiver
of the examination. Among the commissioners earning less than $5,001 these two
reasons (again the most frequent) were cited an equal number of times. Id. at 481.
In differentiating the responses by the population of the area where the commissioner
sits, the survey indicated that as the population increased, an intervening indictment
was more frequently given as a reason for not holding the examination. Id. at 483.8 1 It appears that hearings are sometimes held despite an intervening indictment.
In the Commissioners Survey, supra note 30, at 483, it is reported that "[slurprisingly,
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The bases for the seemingly unwarranted conclusion that the
preliminary examination need not be conducted are found both in the
judicial interpretation of the purpose of the preliminary examination
and in the Federal Rules themselves. The purpose of the examination
is conceived as only "to prevent a person from being held in custody
without a prompt hearing." 32 But a grand jury can perform the same
function: implicit in the indictment is that there is probable cause
to hold the defendant." Thus, a quick determination of probable cause
by the grand jury gives the defendant a prompt hearing and indicates
that he is properly being held. Furthermore, the rules themselves lend
weight to this argument. A defendant who is arrested on a warrant or
summons issued upon an indictment or information is not entitled to a
preliminary examination.3 4 Rules 9(b) (1) and (2), which govern the
disposition of such defendants, state that the defendant is to be "brought
before the court," rather than before the commissioner, the latter being
the route for defendants arrested under a warrant or summons
issued upon a complaint ' or arrested without a warrant.3 6 To give
a post-indictment hearing to a defendant merely because he was arrested
before action was instituted by the grand jury would not only be going
through a meaningless gesture in terms of probable cause, 7 but would
also be giving a defendant indicted after apprehension an opportunity
for discovery not available to those arrested after indictment."8 That
such a distinction seems arbitrary lends support to the conclusions that
the purpose of a preliminary examination is a swift determination of
9% of the commissioners answered that they do hold a hearing in such circumstances."
Some of these responses might be due to confusion between rule 5(a) and rule 5(c)
hearings, the former being the defendants initial appearance before the commissioner
where he is told of his rights to counsel and preliminary examination. But "9 commis-
sioners affirmatively stated that a defendant should not be deprived of a preliminary
hearing because the grand jury indicts." See United States v. Salliey, 360 F.2d 699,
704 (4th Cir. 1966), where the court notes that the district judge suggested that a
preliminary examination be given even though an indictment had been returned.
32 United States v. Gray, 87 F. Supp. 436, 437 (D.D.C. 1949). But see Drew v.
Beard, 290 F.2d 741, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (fact that defendant is at liberty on bond
is no reason for denying a prompt preliminary examination).
33 See Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250 (1932) ("It reasonably cannot
bq doubted that .. . the finding of an indictment . . . conclusively determines the
existence of probable cause for the purpose of holding the accused to answer.") ; United
States v. Universita, 192 F. Supp. 154, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ; United States v. Fitz-
gerald, 29 F.2d 573, 574 (E.D.Pa. 1928) ; United States v. Averett, 26 F.2d 676, 678
(W.D.Va. 1928) (after an indictment "what an examining magistrate thinks as to the
probable guilt of the defendant is of absolutely no importance").
34 Nelson v. Sacks, 290 F.2d 604 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961);
United States v. Shields, 291 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Pickard,
207 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Gomes v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 747 (D.Conn.
1963). This was also true before the Federal Rules. United States ex rel. Kassin v.
Mulligan, 295 U.S. 396 (1935) ; United States v. Simon, 248 F. 980 (E.D.Pa. 1916)
(dictum) ; United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 F. 765 (W.D.N.C. 1883) ; United States v.
Fuers, 25 F. Cas. 1223 (No. 15,174) (D.C.W.D. Pa. 1871).
35 FrD. R. Cat. P. 4(b) (1) and (2).
36 FE. R. Cans. P. 5(a).
37 But see note 25 supra and accompanying text.
3 8 See United States v. Motte, 251 F. Supp. 601, 605 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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probable cause and that discovery under rule 5 (c) is merely an "in-
cidental result." "
Nevertheless, it has been shown that discovery is indeed an im-
portant function of preliminary examinations. But only the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has explicitly recognized
this and taken some limited steps in ordering post-indictment pre-
liminary examinations. In Blue v. United States,4" the defendant, after
conviction, claimed his indictment should have been dismissed upon the
ground that his waiver of preliminary examination was given without
counsel. The court of appeals stressed that the preliminary examination
functions both as a means of determining probable cause and as a dis-
covery device.' Although affirming the conviction, the court stated
that in the future a defendant could challenge the failure to conduct a
preliminary examination by habeas corpus or mandamus after indict-
ment but prior to trial.4 ' The court based its adoption of this procedure
89Id. Most courts will rarely consider and usually reject the contention that the
preliminary examination is a discovery device. See, e.g., United States v. Averett, 26
F.2d 676, 679 (W.D.Va. 1928) ("If there is anywhere authority for the statement that
it is a purpose of the preliminary examination to inform the defendant of the evidence
relied on by the prosecution, I have not encountered it.") ; Martinez v. State, 423 P.2d
700, 711 (Alaska 1967) ("[W]e do not agree that its principal function is that of pro-
viding pre-trial discovery.").
40 342 F2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
4 1 Id. at 899, 901.
42 Id. at 900. It is questionable whether this procedure is permissible under
present law. Habeas corpus does appear to be a proper remedy to review the pre-
liminary examination, at least before an indictment has been returned. In United
States ex rel. Kassin v. Mulligan, 295 U.S. 396 (1935), the Court held that a com-
missioner's findings in a removal proceeding may be reviewed on a writ of habeas
corpus. The reasoning of the Court would also seem applicable to review of the
commissioner's finding of probable cause at the preliminary examination:
The question so raised is whether petitioner is unlawfully deprived of his
liberty. He was entitled to introduce evidence to prove the absence of probable
cause and to have the commissioner judicially consider it...
... The Circuit Court of Appeals ... declined to examine the evidence
upon the ground that "our review of his (the commissioner's) decision ends
as soon as we are assured that he has honestly considered all the evidence
presented to him. No matter how flagrantly mistaken he may be in the result,
a court will go no further." We disapprove that declaration.
rd. at 401-402. Accord, Tinsley v. Treat, 205 U.S. 20 (1907) (removal proceedings);
Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 715, 716 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (habeas corpus was
proper remedy at common law) ; United States v. Bloomgart, 24 F. Cas. 1180 (No.
14,612) (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (habeas corpus used to challenge sufficiency of evidence
before magistrate at preliminary examination); In re Bates, 2 F. Cas. 1015 (No.
1099a) (D.C.S.C. 1858). Contra, DiCesare v. Chernenko, 303 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.
1962) (habeas corpus improper save in exceptional circumstances; motion to dismiss
commitment is appropriate).
But after an indictment is returned, habeas corpus does not seem to be a proper
method to review the commissioner's determination of probable cause, since the de-
fendant is now no longer "unlawfully deprived of his liberty." At this point, the
defendant's remedy, denominated most often as a motion to dismiss the indictment,
would appear to rest on the theory advanced in United States v. Casino, 286 F. 976
(S.D.N.Y. 1923), which involved a commissioner's denial of the relief which should
have been granted under statute. judge Learned Hand held that review of his conduct
could "at any time be taken over by the court of which the commissioner is an officer,"
because the commissioner acts in a "ministerial" or "quasi-judicial" capacity. Id. at
980. Accord, Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 354 (1931) ; United States
v. Florida, 165 F. Supp. 328, 331 (E.D.Ark. 1958); United States v. Zerbst, 111
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on the District of Columbia Legal Aid Act,4" which provided for the
assignment of counsel to indigents at preliminary examinations in
felony cases. The court reasoned that if Congress "had thought that
disregard of its efforts to provide counsel in preliminary examinations
. . . could be absolved by the return of an indictment, there would
seem to have been little point in its taking the trouble to address itself
directly to the provision of counsel in preliminary examinations in
felony cases." 44 Thus the denial of a hearing should not be "swept
under the rug of a grand jury indictment" nor should the availability
of a remedy depend upon whether defense counsel brings habeas corpus
or mandamus to compel the hearing before the United States Attorney
obtains an indictment.
45
The extension of Blue has been slow,46 and has not gone un-
challenged by certain judges of the District of Columbia Circuit.
47
However, Blue has been successfully invoked in circumstances other
than uncounseled waiver of the preliminary examination. In Holmes
v. United States,48 the defendant, appealing his conviction, relied on
Blue to convince the court to remand for a hearing on whether his
lawyer at the preliminary examination was incompetent or "failed to
F. Supp. 807, 809 (E.D.S.C. 1953); United States v. Berry, 4 F. 779 (D.Colo. 1880).
Regardless of the remedy pursued, courts have been notably reluctant to review
a commissioner's finding of probable cause. E.g., United States v. Zerbst, 111 F. Supp.
at 810 ("I would refuse, however, to review the findings of the commissioner in any
case except one such as this. In this case, the defendant is a county police officer
... .") ; Washington v. Clenmmer, 339 F.2d 715, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ("The course
taken.., opens up countless applications for the writ with subsequent appeal, leading
inevitably to interminable delays in the trial of criminal cases.") (statement by Dana-
her, Miller and Bastian, JJ.).
The remedy will, however, make a difference for appellate review. Habeas corpus
is appealable by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1964) ; when the commissioner's ministerial
actions are reviewed on a motion to dismiss 'the indictment, the district court's de-
termination is interlocutory, i.e., denial of the motion does not terminate the criminal
proceedings. Therefore, it would almost certainly not be appealable. Parenthetically,
it is interesting to note that one commissioner asserted at the hearings on the Federal
Magistrates Act that "there is no appeal from the magistrate's essentially adminis-
trative determination." Testimony of Robert J. O'Connor, U.S. Commissioner, District
of Kansas, Hearings, supra note 6, at 204 (emphasis added).
Another difference in the denomination of the remedy is the interesting possibility
that habeas corpus, being a civil action, would enable the defendant to avail himself
of the discovery devices of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See United States
ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53, 63-64 (5th Cir. 1962) (civil discovery devices
available; question not discussed), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915 (1963) ; Knowles v.
Gladden, 254 F. Supp. 643 (D.Ore. 1965) ; cf. Chessman v. Teets, 239 F.2d 205 (9th
Cir. 1956), revd on other grounds, 354 U.S. 156 (1957). Contra, Sullivan v. United
States, 198 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1964)).
43 D.C. CODE AxN. § 2-2202 (1967).
44 Blue v. United States, 342 F2d at 899.
45 Id. at 899-900.
46Blue has been specifically rejected in United States v. Motte, 251 F. Supp. 601,
605 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), and, under analogous state rules, in Martinez v. State, 423
P.2d 700, 711-12 (Alaska 1967).
47 See the views of the various judges in the denial of rehearing en banc in Ross
v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557, 561-69 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
48 370 F.2d 209, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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function." In Ross v. Sirica,49 the defendant, on a pre-trial motion,
was granted a post-indictment examination at which the commissioner
was ordered to grant his request to subpoena witnesses. Thus from
the uncounselled waiver in Blue, the court has moved to granting a
post-indictment examination in a case where the defendant was "de-
prived of a proper hearing" " because he did not have the opportunity
to present evidence bearing on probable cause.
The problem with Ross, and indeed with Blue itself, is demon-
strated in another District of Columbia case decided after Blue. In
Crump v. Anderson,5 the defendant (unlike Mr. Blue) was not de-
prived of his right to counsel 52-- his preliminary examination was con-
tinued for a total of eleven days so that counsel could be appointed."
During that time an indictment was returned and, on the scheduled
date, the commissioner dismissed the examination. The court of
appeals, in refusing to grant a post-indictment examination, treated the
case as a rule 9 proceeding,5" 4 despite the fact that Crump was arrested
before indictment.5 This characterization can only be explained as
based on the conception, implicit in the rules, that the preliminary
examination serves only to find probable cause, and is unnecessary after
an indictment has been returned. It would seem impossible to reconcile
this view of the preliminary examination with that expressed in
Blue 56 -or with the results in Holmes and Ross. As the dissenting
49 380 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1967).50 Id. at 560.
5 352 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
52 This was one ground on which Crump was distinguished from Blue. Crump v.
Anderson, 352 F.2d at 656 n.20.5 3 Id. at 650.
The commissioner is a judicial officer who has a "right, for good cause shown, to
grant a continuance of a hearing." United States v. Gray, 87 F. Supp. 436, 438 (D.D.C.
1949). Some interesting examples of the "good cause shown" are found in Contmis-
sioners Survey, supra note 30, at 485:
Reasons advanced by the government on behalf of a request for continu-
ance in a preliminary hearing include: conflict in schedules (reported by 50
commissioners) ; additional time to prepare (reported by 48 commissioners) ;
time to obtain indictment (reported by 15 commissioners) ; time to arrange to
come to the commissioner's location from a distant U.S. Attorney's office
(reported by 12 commissioners).
A number of commissioners mentioned that the government requests addi-
tional time in order to obtain additional evidence, leading to the inference
that as of the time the continuance was requested, the government did not have
enough evidence to establish "probable cause."
For other reasons, see id. at 485-86. The survey also showed that "[tiwo hundred
eleven commissioners said that they routinely grant continuances requested by both
government and the defense; 101 that they do not routinely grant such requests; 5 said
that they routinely grant requests by the government only; and 7 that they routinely
grant requests by the defense only." Id. at 486.
The proposed Federal Magistrates Act, S.945, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), would
write into law a ten-day limitation (or twenty days if the defendant is out on bail)
on holding the examination. This limit could be set aside by the district judge if
indispensible to the attainment of justice.
54As pointed out above, the difference in proceedings under rule 5 and rule 9
reinforces the conclusion that post-indictment examinations cannot be ordered con-
sistently with the Federal Rules. See notes 34-39 rupra and accompanying text.
55 Crump v. Anderson, 352 F.2d at 650, 657.
G6 See text accompanying note 41 mtpra.
THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
judge in Crump stated, "[s]ince a preliminary proceeding without the
advice of counsel is ground for relief when timely raised, a fortiori, the
denial of a hearing altogether is a ground for relief." "
The problem is with Blue itself-given the context of the rules,
Blue must be wrong."' To provide indigents with counsel in prelim-
inary examinations is not to give a mandate for ordering post-indict-
ment examinations. It merely requires that when a preliminary
examination is held, counsel must be provided.59 It may prove crucial
that the defendant is represented at the preliminary examination if it
takes place, aside from whether the examination be held at all. The
importance of counsel at this stage is well illustrated by Nance v.
United States,"0 where the defendant, representing himself at the
examination, asked a robbery victim this "near historic inquiry: 'How
do you know it was me, when I had a handkerchief over my face?' "61
The question was admitted at trial, obviously with damaging results.
Admittedly, ordering a post-indictment hearing may be one remedy
that could be fashioned where an uncounseled examination occurred. 2
But this remedy would be of little help to someone in the Nance
situation, where the damage has already been done; a more effective
remedy in such a case would be to hold the statement inadmissible
5
7 Crump v. Anderson, 352 F.2d at 658.
68 It must be noted that Blue cannot be rejected because of its reliance on the
District of Columbia Legal Aid Act. Rules 44 and 5(b) have since been amended,
the former providing for assigned counsel to indigents "at every stage of the proceed-
ings from his initial appearance before the commissioner or the court through appeal"
and the latter providing that the commissioner must inform the defendant that counsel
will be appointed if he is unable to obtain counsel. These provisions go even further
than the District of Columbia act under which Blue was decided. See text accompany-
ing note 43 mspra.
59 There is some doubt whether there is a constitutional right to counsel in a pre-
liminary examination in the federal system. Although in White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
59 (1963), the Court held Maryland's preliminary examination to be a "critical stage"
requiring counsel, the defendant there was called upon to plead. Rule 5 (c) specifically
forbids asking for the defendant's plea. In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965),
the state's preliminary examination did not allow pleas, but the Court refused to decide
whether counsel was required, stating that White was not "necessarily controlling."
Id. at 402. For indications that the preliminary examination may indeed be a "critical
stage," see text accompanying notes 60-61 infra. A lower court has held that the
defendant does have a constitutional right to counsel at the preliminary examination.
Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (alternative ground) (Rut-
ledge, J.). Contra, Burrall v. Johnston, 53 F. Supp. 126 (N.D.Cal. 1943), aff'd, 146
F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945) ; see 1 L. ORFIELD, CRIM-
INA. PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEERAL RuLEs 257 (1966) ("One must conclude from
the cases that there is no constitutional right to counsel at the stage of the proceedings
before the commissioner.. ").
60 359 F.2d 273 (D.C.Cir. 1966).
01 Id. at 274.
2That counsel may be important, not only during the examination, but also in
deciding whether to waive the examination, is indicated in Commissioners Survey,
supra note 30, at 479-80. This conclusion lends support to Blue, where defendant
waived the examination without counsel. The survey indicates that a large percentage
of urban commissioners felt that counsel and waiver were related. One commissioner
responded that "'[c]ounsel are not nearly so quick to waive hearing as defendant who
is anxious normally to be released on bond and is not interested in hearing * * *."
Id. at 479. But regardless of the support the data may give to Blue on the waiver-
counsel issue, it is of no help in cases where the defendant, represented by counsel,
fails to get a hearing because of continuances and an intervening indictment.
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at trial. Most other complaints would deal with the probable cause
aspects and would be mooted by the indictment, which conclusively
determines that probable cause exists.6 Thus Blue not only is in-
consistent with the rules, but also fails to provide an adequate remedy
in the type of situation where an uncounseled preliminary examination
damages the defendant. It certainly affords no opportunity for ex-
pansion to cases where defects other than lack of counsel occur at
the examination.
The present rules, therefore, can lead to only one conclusion:
indictment moots the right to preliminary examination. But the
preliminary examination, when utilized, does give some measure of
discovery to defendants.6" From a policy standpoint, the question is
whether the United States Attorney ought to be permitted to circum-
vent the preliminary examination. It must be understood that this
question should not be confused with the general controversy over
expansion of criminal discovery."5 Nor does the question present the
choice of either expanding the preliminary hearing along the English
lines or adopting the devices now used in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.6 Since the preliminary examination is functioning,
6 7 evi-
dently without the disastrous results prophesied by some opponents
of greater criminal discovery, the question is merely whether this device
ought to be utilized more fully until the time comes when a more
accurate prediction can be made about the effects of expanded criminal
discovery. If the answer is in the affirmative, and the considerations
examined above 68 indicate that it should be, then the proper solution is
a change in the rules to make the preliminary examination mandatory.
9
6
3 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
64 See notes 19-27 supra and accompanying text.
65 Compare Flannery, Prosecutor's Position, Discovery in Federal Criminal Gases,
33 F.R.D. 47, 74 (1963), with Pye, The Defendaie's Case for More Liberal Discovery,
Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 82 (1963).
66 See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L. J. 1149, 1193 (1960) (rather than adopting examination modeled
along English line, discovery devices similar to those in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure should be utilized since American courts are more accustomed to applying
them) ; S. REP. No. 371, supra note 18, at 34 ("While your committee agrees that
criminal discovery in the Federal courts should be more liberal than it has been in
the past ... your committee is of the opinion that the problem of discovery should be
treated separately from that of the preliminary hearing.").
67 For example, in Pennsylvania a defendant must receive a preliminary examina-
tion before his case can be submitted to the grand jury for indictment See Common-
wealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa. Super. 382, 393 (1956), appeal dismissed, 389 Pa. 109,
132 A.2d 185 (1957). Arlen Specter, District Attorney of Philadelphia, states that
'[i]n the interests of justice . . . it is my view that a preliminary hearing is highly
desirable." And this despite his feeling that "[t]he discovery gained by the defendant
at the preliminary examination sometimes has an adverse effect on the administration
of criminal justice because the defendant is able to learn a great deal about the prose-
cution's case without any reciprocity on discovery." Letter from Arlen Specter,
March 26, 1968, on file at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. See note 24
supra. But cf. note 30 supra.6
8 See notes 19-27 supra and accompanying text.
69 The proposed Federal Magistrates Act, S. 945, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967),
would, on the contrary, write the standard mootness holding into statute. See note 53
supra.
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IV. PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE FEDERAL RULES
One way to make the preliminary examination mandatory is to
amend rules 5 and 9 70 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 5 "' might be amended as follows (new matter is shown in italics):
(c) Preliminary Examination
(1) Procedure. All defendants shall be entitled to a
preliminary examination, regardless of whether an indictment
has been returned. The defendant shall not be called upon
to plead. If the defendant waives preliminary examination,
the commissioner shall forthwith hold him to answer in the
district court. If the defendant does not waive examination,
the commissioner shall hear the evidence within a reasonable
time; but when the defendant is brought before the commis-
sioner before an indictment for the offense has been returned,
the commissioner shall hear the evidence no later than the
day when the attorney for the government begins presenting
the matter to the grand jury. In no event shall a copy of an
indictment or information be admissible into evidence at the
examination. A court stenographer shall transcribe the pro-
ceedings and the defendant may request a copy of the record
made, such copy to be given to an indigent defendant at no
expense to him.72  The defendant may cross-examine wit-
70 Minor changes would also have to be made in FED. R. CRix. P. 40(a) and
40(b) (3), which maintain the distinction between defendants arrested before and
after indictment
71 F R. CRInr. P. 5 concerns defendants arrested before indictment; FEa. R.
CumI. P. 9 concerns defendants arrested after indictment.
72 Professor Moore writes that "[a]t present, a defendant has no right to have a
stenographer present at the hearing, unless he can afford to hire his own. This situa-
tion is certainly discriminatory. Use of the preliminary hearing to lay the groundwork
for impeachment of government witnesses at the trial does not amount to much if no
record of the hearing is available." 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 5.04[4], at 5-34
(2d ed. 1967). But cf. 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1964) (judge may request court reporter to
transcribe parts of a proceeding) ; MANUAL FOR UNrrED STATES ComMissiONERs 10
(rev. ed. 1948) (official court reporters may be secured by commissioner, with consent
of the judge, unless they are actually engaged in attendance upon a session of court;
record to be made without charge, but transcript ordered by defendant must be paidfor).In Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1964), the court ordered that
a stenographer be provided at a preliminary examination without cost to an indigent
defendant, stating that "[t]o deny this opportunity to an indigent defendant would be
to permit invidious discrimination based on wealth." Id. at 718. They further noted
that in the absence of a transcript, which is not required under the present rule, it is
difficult if not impossible to review the commissioner's finding of probable cause, and
that a transcript "perpetuates the fresh memory of witnesses, making it available in
case of subsequent death, disability, or flight, and allowing impeachment or refreshing
of recollections at trial." Id. at 717.
Title III of the proposed Federal Magistrates Act, S. 945, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967), provides that the proceedings be taken down by a court reporter or "suitable
sound recording equipment!' and that a copy "be made available at the expense of
the United States to a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay or give
security therefor, and the expense- of such copy shall be paid by the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts." Title IIn of the 1966 proposal,
S. 3475, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., provided merely that a copy "shall be made available to
an indigent defendant at no expense to him."
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nesses against him and may introduce evidence in his own
behalf. If from the evidence it appears to the commissioner
that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the defendant has committed it, the com-
missioner shall forthwith hold him to answer in the district
court; otherwise the commissioner shall discharge him. The
commissioner shall admit the defendant to bail as provided in
these rules. After concluding the proceeding the commis-
sioner shall transmit forthwith to the clerk of the district
court all papers in the proceeding and any bail taken by him.
(2) Motion for Relief. Should the commissioner fail
to comply with the provisions of subdivision (1), or should
he erroneously find probable cause to hold the defendant, the
district court shall, upon motion of the defendant before
trial, order the commissioner to hold an examination; or, if
an examination has been held, the district court shall deter-
mine whether the evidence presented reasonably supports the
commissioner's finding of probable cause. Should the district
court find that the commissioner's determination cannot be so
supported, he shall discharge the defendant, and if an indict-
ment or information has been returned, he shall order it
dismissed.
Rule 9 might be amended by adding the following new sections:
(d) Procedure When Defendant Is Brought Before the
Court. If the defendant has not received a preliminary
examination, the district court shall order a commissioner to
conduct one, as provided in Rule 5(c) (1). If a commissioner
had previously conducted a preliminary examination at which
he discharged the defendant, and the district court determines
that the evidence presented at the preliminary examination
reasonably supports the commissioner's finding of no probable
cause, he shall discharge the defendant and order the indict-
ment or information dismissed; but if the district court deter-
mines that the commissioner's finding cannot be so supported,
he shall hold the defendant for trial and admit him to bail
as provided in these rules.
(e) Motion for Further Relief. If a commissioner has
discharged the defendant, after a preliminary examination on
an offense for which an indictment is still outstanding, and the
attorney for the government has failed to request a warrant or
summons as provided in section (a)," and if a commissioner
73FED. R. CRIm. P. 9(a) describes the procedure for issuance of a warrant or
summons upon indictment or information.
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has not held a subsequent examination at which probable cause
was found, the defendant, at any time after thirty days from
the date he was discharged by the commissioner, may make a
motion to the district court to dismiss the indictment. If the
district court determines that the evidence presented at the
preliminary examination reasonably supports the commis-
sioner's finding of no probable cause, he shall order the indict-
ment dismissed, unless contrary to the interests of justice.
A brief description of how the suggested provisions should function
may be helpful. The United States Attorney would initially have the
choice of arresting the defendant under a rule 4 warrant, issued upon
a complaint, or under a rule 9 warrant, issued upon an indictment or
information. Both procedures would present the defendant to the
commissioner for a preliminary examination 71 to determine whether
probable cause exists. If he finds no probable cause, he would discharge
the defendant. If he finds probable cause, he would hold the defendant
for trial; the defendant would then have the choice of accepting the
commissioner's determination or making a motion, before trial,75 for
74 Defendants arrested before or after indictment would be entitled to an examina-
tion "within a reasonable time." Defendants arrested before indictment, however,
would receive their preliminary examinations no later than the day the United States
Attorney goes to the grand jury. Under 5(c) (2) all defendants would be entitled
to make a "demand" motion to get a preliminary examination if the commissioner has
not held one within the prescribed period.
It is hoped that this entire procedure will give some content to the "reasonable
time" provision in the present rule, thus taking away from the magistrate his almost
unlimited discretion to grant postponements. See discussion of the proposed Federal
Magistrates Act, note 53 .rupra. While the United States Attorney may quite legiti-
mately ask for delays in the preliminary examination, for example to enable him to
assemble his witnesses, when he is ready to present the evidence to the grand jury
there appears to be no reason why he would not be just as well prepared for the pre-
liminary examination. To give an extreme example of granting postponements, in
United States v. Delman, 253 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), there were nearly fifty
postponements of the preliminary examination extending over four years before an
indictment was returned. Defense counsel there, however, were partly responsible,
since they never appeared after the initial postponement. In United States v. Cowan,
37 F.R.D. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the examination was postponed five times, over an
almost three-month period, without either defense counsel or the commissioner being
asked-the Assistant United States Attorney merely marked the commissioner's
calendar the afternoon before the examination with whatever date he thought appro-
priate. See Drew v. Beard, 290 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (defendants alleged that
commissioner, stating that he would not allow examination to be used as a means of
discovery, postponed examination for the purpose of awaiting indictment) ; James v.
Lawrence, 176 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (month delay, the grand jury not having yet
acted, is not unreasonable; when true bill is returned there will be no need for ex-
amination). Many state statutes place a time limit on granting continuances. See
ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCDURE §§ 39-60 (1931).
In addition, holding the preliminary examination on the same day that the United
States Attorney goes to the grand jury would be more efficient, at least from the
standpoint of witness inconvenience. See United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Flood,
269 F. Supp. 194, 198-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
75 The proposed rule contemplates a pre-trial motion; absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances resulting in unusual prejudice to the defendant, a deficient preliminary
examination would not justify reversal of a conviction on appeal. The court in
Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894, 900-01 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
944 (1965), adopted this procedure and gave rather convincing reasons:
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review by the district judge under rule 5 (c) (2). If the district judge
finds that the evidence presented at the preliminary examination
reasonably supports the finding of probable cause, he would hold the
defendant for trial; "' if he finds that the evidence does not support the
commissioner's determination, he would discharge the defendant. Any
indictment returned before the district judge's discharge of the de-
fendant would be dismissed.
Faced with a finding of no probable cause by a commissioner, the
United States attorney may choose to drop the prosecution or to re-
arrest the defendant, possibly after gathering more evidence. If he re-
arrests under rule 4, the above procedure would again operate. If he
chooses to use rule 9, for which he would need an indictment or informa-
tion, the defendant would be brought before the district court, which
would then have to review the commissioner's finding of no probable
cause to determine whether it was reasonably supported by the evidence
presented at the preliminary examination. If it was, the defendant would
be discharged and the indictment or information would be dismissed;
if it was not--i.e., probable cause was shown at the examination-the
defendant would be held for trial. For defendants discharged at this
point, the process could conceivably continue until there is a finding
of probable cause by a commissioner and either a failure by the de-
fendant to appeal or an affirmance by the district court of the com-
missioner's finding of probable cause.
The defendant would also have several options open to him. He
may decide not to appeal the commissioner's determination of probable
cause, or he may decide to waive the examination. He may also
"demand" review of the commissioner's determination of no probable
cause at any time more than thirty days after the examination in
order to get an outstanding indictment dismissed. Under the rule 9(e)
procedure suggested, the defendant would bring himself into court
instead of waiting for the United States Attorney to act, thus avoiding
to some extent the unpleasant pressure of suspended proceedings.
All the procedures described above appear to be necessary to
effectuate the main purpose of the proposed rules, which is to give all
defendants preliminary examinations regardless of when an indictment
is returned. The major difficulty this raises is the occurrence of post-
With counsel appearing either at the preliminary hearing stage itself, or, at the
latest, before arraignment upon the indictment, there is normally adequate time
before trial to file the necessary petitions if they are called for. Naturally,
the attorney will be entitled, upon consultation with his client, to decide that a
minor flaw is not worth challenging, or that, as a tactical matter, it is to the
defendant's advantage to forego the point. Thus, unless some reason is shown
why counsel could not have discovered and challenged the defect before trial,
it will generally be assumed that any objections to the preliminary proceed-
ings were considered and waived, and no post-conviction remedies will be
available.
76 If the district judge agrees with the commissioner's determination of probable
cause, the defendant may have a chance for appellate review by habeas corpus, at least
before an indictment has been returned. See note 42 supra.
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indictment examinations-there must be some way to insure that they
will be meaningful. If they were ordered under present law, it is
possible that the United States Attorney would not present sufficient
evidence at the preliminary examination, knowing that he could still
go to trial on the indictment, regardless of the commissioner's ruling.77
A sanction is needed to force the United States Attorney to present
enough evidence to show probable cause and to attach important
consequences to the commissioner's finding. The sanction chosen is
dismissal of the indictment.78  In certain cases, however, this would
77 It is also possible that a commissioner, knowing an indictment has been re-
turned, would not weigh the evidence with much deliberation. Making the indictment
inadmissible at the preliminary examination, as the proposed rule 5(c) (1) would,
ought to avoid this type of prejudice.
78 The proposed rules also provide that an information, like an indictment, shall
be dismissed upon the court's finding that probable cause was wanting. It is doubtful
that such a result could obtain under the present rules. Although no cases could be
found where a court held that preliminary examination was mooted when, after arrest,
the United States Attorney decided to proceed by information under FED. R. CMaM.
P. 7(a), such a result would seem to be required by the present rules. FE. R. CRIM.
P. 9(b) (1) and 9(b) (2) provide that a defendant arrested on a warrant or summons
issued upon an information must be brought before the court. As in the case of a
defendant arrested after an indictment, therefore, the defendant arrested after an in-
formation is not entitled to a preliminary examination. Cf. United States v. Pickard,
207 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1953). Therefore, an intervening information, like an inter-
vening indictment, should moot the preliminary examination; see notes 31-39 supra
and accompanying text. One pre-rules case denied a motion to quash an intervening
indictment. United States v. Achen, 267 F. 595 (E.D.N.Y. 1920). Before the rules,
it appears that
[d]espite some practice and statements to the contrary, it may be accepted
as settled, that leave [to file an information] must be obtained; and that
before granting leave, the court must, in some way, satisfy itself that there
is probable cause for the prosecution. . . . The United States Attorney['s] ...
official oath may be accepted as sufficient to give verity to the allegations of
the information.
Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1927) (Brandeis, J.). The result, of
course, is that such a defendant would get no preliminary examination. See United
States v. Simon, 248 F. 980 (E.D. Pa. 1916). Nevertheless, there is some indication
of a practice of granting an examination in such circumstances:
Whether the information presents a proper case for granting leave . . . to
file, is a question for the exercise of a sound discretion by the Court. Gen-
erally, in this circuit ... it has been required that the party charged shall be
examined and held to answer by some committing magistrate, or else that
evidence showing probable cause should be made to appear in some proper
form before granting leave.
United States v. Reilley, 20 F. 46 (C.C. Nev. 1884).
Under the rules, however, an information may be filed without leave of court,
FED. R. CRmr. P. 7(a), but a warrant for a defendant named in the information must
be "supported by oath" before the court may issue it, thus satisfying Albrecht. FED. R.
CRan. P. 9(a). It is nevertheless difficult to see how an information supported by
oath supplies much greater assurance of probable cause than does a complaint "made
upon oath." FED. R. CRIm. P. 3. The complaint sets in motion proceedings under
rule 5; the information does not. But should we be less worried about defendants
being frivolously prosecuted-or about their obtaining a measure of discovery-simply
because they are not liable to imprisonment for more than one year? Under the
proposed rule 5(c), this loophole would be closed, although admittedly dismissal of
the information, as provided in subdivision (2), would be considerably less trouble-
some to the United States Attorney than dismissal of an indictment, and his incentive
to assure that the preliminary examination was adequate correspondingly less. The
process of swearing to an information would seem considerably simpler than prepara-
tion and presentation of a case to a grand jury. On the other hand, we are speaking
here of misdemeanors, where the pressure on the prosecutor for convictions is con-
siderably less. This fact, along with the prosecutor's sense of honor in swearing to
the information, should alleviate most of the problems.
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effectively allow a commissioner's finding of no probable cause to
overrule the grand jury's finding of probable cause."9 Nevertheless,
the procedure adopted for this "overruling," in addition to being the
only way to give defendants arrested after indictment the same chance
for discovery as those arrested before indictment, also gives greater
assurance that all defendants are being properly held for trial, and
sufficiently checks an inaccurate determination by a commissioner.
The sanction of dismissing an indictment may seem harsh, but it
is difficult to conceive of a sanction which would be less harsh and
yet be effective. Without an indictment, and with the defendant re-
leased from custody, the United States Attorney is back where he
started. He must rearrest the defendant, if he can,8" and go through
the time and effort of re-indicting. This certainly should compel the
United States Attorney to present an adequate case at the preliminary
examination. The alternative-leaving to his discretion whether to
continue prosecution after a post-indictment finding of no probable
cause-does not appear to be an effective way to insure meaningful pre-
liminary examinations, particularly if he is intent on avoiding
discovery.81
The situation may arise where, at a post-indictment examination,
the United States Attorney presents all his evidence and the commis-
sioner rules that there is no probable cause. It has already been noted
that the grand jury may not be the best vehicle for determining probable
cause, particularly in light of its ex parte nature; ' if the United States
Attorney cannot produce enough evidence of probable cause in open
court, it is difficult to understand why he ought to be allowed to go to
trial, regardless of what the grand jury has done.
Nevertheless, the grand jury has the historical preference in deter-
mining probable cause. The proposed rules attempt to resolve the
conflict between this preference and the need for a meaningful post-
indictment examination by giving the district judge sole power to
dismiss the indictment on review of the commissioner's findings.
8
79 The ultimate decision, however, would be that of the district court. See text
accompanying note 83 infra.
80 The defendant may have left the jurisdiction, or the statute of limitations may
have reared its fearsome head.
81 See text accompanying note 1 supra. The court in Blue v. United States, 342
F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965), was faced with this prob-
lem, but rejected the remedy of dismissing the indictment. The court's reasoning does
not seem compelling: "Wiping the slate clean is always a tidily appealing solution, but
we are not convinced that it is necessary to go so far . . . ." Id. at 900. It noted that
a finding of no probable cause "would not affect the indictment, although the Commis-
sioner's action would presumably cause the prosecutor to review the indictment again
with care." Id. at 900 n.7 (emphasis added).
82 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
83 The standard suggested for the district court's post-indictment review of a
finding of no probable cause-whether such a finding was reasonable in light of the
evidence presented at the hearing-is obviously not the only possibility. The other
likely choice-whether it would have been reasonable to have found probable cause-
would, however, almost certainly prove unworkable. In all but the very scantest of
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Allowing an experienced trier of fact to resolve this conflict seems to be
a functional solution; he would, at trial, be required to make a similar
determination upon defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of the
prosecution's case. The standard for review would be in keeping with
the fact that the United States Attorney need only present enough evi-
dence to show probable cause. In assessing this, the district court
would be helped by the provision that a record must be made of the
proceedings at the preliminary examination. Further, in cases where
the commissioner has found probable cause, the judge would be able to
tell, for example, whether the commissioner allowed cross-examination,
whether a copy of the indictment was introduced at the hearing, and
whether the defendant was represented by counsel. Failure to follow
the provisions of 5(c) (1) would militate strongly towards, if not
compel, a reversal of the commissioner's finding of probable cause.
Thus, by reviewing the commissioner's actions, the district court would
be able not only to assure the defendant's opportunity for discovery,
but also to determine whether the defendant ought to stand trial.
V. CONCLUSION
Implementation of the changes suggested in this Comment would
not radically alter the nature of the preliminary examination. The pre-
liminary examination has evolved from a prosecutorial tool into a pro-
tective device for the defendant, and the proposed rules are designed to
strengthen this feature. They would insure that all defendants accused
of federal crimes have the opportunity to come before a judicial officer
shortly after arrest. Moreover, they would provide a degree of discovery
to those who desire it, lending integrity to the fact-finding process and
possibly providing a means for gathering empirical data about the
effects of criminal discovery on the processes involved. This informa-
tion would be helpful in evaluating the desirability of expanding dis-
covery in the criminal law context. Finally, the proposed rules would
insure that the choice of whether a preliminary examination is held is
that of the defendant, and not, as under present law, that of the
prosecutor. It is hoped that these proposed rules would have beneficial
effects on the administration of justice, far outweighing the cost in
time and dollars which their adoption would entail.
preliminary examinations it would be possible to find probable cause; but the commis-
sioner will have had the benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses, and this second
standard would totally deny the value of his evaluation of witnesses' credibility. Such
review of post-indictment examinations would almost invariably result in a reversal
of any finding of no probable cause. Not only would this substantially diminish the
compulsion on the United States Attorney to present an adequate case, but frequent
reversals would also in all probability lead the magistrates into a dangerously low
standard of probable cause in all cases.
